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Tab 1

Discussion and Suggestions

Problem I

A. General Problem:

To determine the requirements for wartime DD/I organizational changes, concepts of operations and other adjustments necessary to most effectively integrate the DD/I functions and personnel into CIA wartime operations.

B. Discussion: 25X1A9a

1. [REDACTED] discussed OHR's tentative plans for wartime operations both in the overseas theaters and at CIA Headquarters. Among other things, he mentioned the types of support OHR could provide in the overseas theaters and at Headquarters, the skills possessed by OHR personnel, the expected numerical increase in personnel for wartime operations, and the maintenance of a list of former employees who presumably could be called back in an emergency.

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2. [REDACTED] Assistant to the DD/C, briefed the group on OHR's role in economic warfare.

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3. [REDACTED] also spoke to the group on his concept of DD/I's central role in the coordination of estimates.

4. A summarization of the concepts of the functions and deployment of other DD/I components follows:

OO - No overseas support planned. FBIS activity would continue.

OEE - No overseas support planned. Would concern itself with the production of brief estimates.

OCI - No substantial overseas support planned. Probable deployment of a limited number of analysts to overseas theaters. Principal activity in COMUS would be to conduct briefings and to operate the Current Intelligence Center.

OBI - No overseas support planned. OBI's main activity would be concentrated at CIA Headquarters.

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OSI - Probably only a few OSI liaison representatives in overseas theaters. OSI's main activity would be at Headquarters.

OCR - OCR presumably would set up library and reference facilities both at overseas and at augmentation sites. OCR already has a library and a librarian

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5. DD/I tentative plans for deployment to the overseas theaters were discussed at some length. Some of the factors involved were (a) the probability that DD/I personnel could not be moved overseas after the outbreak of hostilities without extensive delay, and (b) a strong probability that communications facilities between Headquarters and the overseas theaters would be inadequate. The DD/I personnel ceiling and the general overseas slot situation appear to be barriers to immediate overseas deployment of DD/I personnel against the contingency of war.

6. The stockpiling of reference works, supplies, and special equipment in overseas theaters was also discussed. The consensus is that these materials should be stockpiled in advance of hostilities in the overseas theaters.

C. Suggestions:

1. Consideration might usefully be given to the desirability of a review of the DD/I personnel ceiling and the overseas slot situation with a view to minimizing the advance deployment of DD/I personnel to overseas theaters to the extent deemed necessary.
2. Lists of materials and equipment necessary for DD/I operations in the overseas theaters can be prepared in advance and arrangements made for the stockpiling of such materials in the overseas theaters.
3. It is suggested that representatives of the DD/I establish liaison with the DD/P overseas contingent as soon as possible.
4. It appears desirable that additional DD/I personnel be sent to the OTR War Planning Training Course.
5. It is suggested that DD/I personnel establish close coordination with the DD/P WPD to determine more specifically DD/P requirements, both overseas and in the CIA Headquarters in the event of war.

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Discussions and Suggestions

Problem II

A. General Problem:

Review the proposed Revised Relocation Plan for CIA Headquarters (attachment 2). Consider the problem and staff action which must be taken to accomplish such relocation and to reconstruct an operating CIA Headquarters.

B. Discussion:

1. The proposed revised emergency relocation plan has been revised in accordance with the new evacuation planning of civil defense authorities. In addition, it proposes that an augmentation relocation site be selected by the Agency to house the reinforcement relocation force.

2. The rationale behind the establishment of an augmentation site is set forth in memorandum, Factors Affecting a New Emergency Relocation Plan for the Central Intelligence Agency (attachment 3).

3. One of the difficulties encountered in discussing the general problem was caused by the presentation of two varying estimates of the vulnerability of the present relocation site in the event of a nuclear attack on Washington. One of the estimates indicated that the present relocation site was a relatively safe place. The other estimate indicated that the present site was extremely vulnerable. Another difficulty was that no estimate was presented concerning the probable number of CIA survivors after an attack on Washington.

4. Four problems were recognized as major. Two of these problems-- estimates of the enemy's ability to sustain a continued war effort, and plans for the Post-War World--would require intelligence support from the DD/I.

5. Consideration was given to a proposal to establish a series of augmentation sites in the general area of the present relocation site. Consideration was also given to a proposal to establish the living quarters of CIA personnel in a series of sites.

6. The DD/S representative indicated that plans were being formulated to expedite security clearances in the event of hostilities.

7. The GFR representative outlined GFR's tentative plans for operation at the relocation site (fundamentally the same as those proposed in 1957).

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C. Augmentations:

1. The two conflicting estimates of the vulnerability of the relocation site should be reconciled.

2. It is suggested that estimates of the probable number of CIA survivors be made.

3. After estimates of the number of survivors have been made dispersal and augmentation sites for CIA employees could be selected for use during the emergency.

4. It is suggested that CIA employees be encouraged to familiarize themselves with civil defense survival techniques. Such familiarization would help to minimize employees' problems in connection with welfare of CIA dependents.

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